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Since the SARS epidemic in 2003, and the subsequent identification of bats as the reservoir host, 
there has been a surge of interest in research into bat-borne viruses, with over 30 new bat 
coronaviruses alone being discovered. Investigating the cell tropism of these newly discovered 
coronaviruses deepens the understanding of their pathology and possible host ranges, as well 
as allowing assessments to be made on their zoonotic potential. Aside from biosafety concerns 
however, this is also reliant on isolation of the virus from its host, which can be difficult using 
conventional methods.  
This project aimed to develop a second generation lentivirus pseudotyping system which would 
allow spike proteins, the main determinants of coronavirus cell entry, of a non-isolated 
coronavirus to be safely expressed on a lentiviral particle in order to assess its cell tropism. The 
system was developed and tested using the spike gene from CoV1087, a novel bat-borne 
coronavirus with a 70% similarity at both the coding RNA and amino acid level between its spike 
protein and that of porcine epidemic diarrhea virus strain CH-HNYF-14.  
Overall this study resulted in the successful development of a lentiviral pseudotyping system 
which allows the efficient analysis of the cellular tropism of coronaviruses. Through the testing 
and development of this system, it was determined that CoV1087 could enter two human cell 
lines, 293T and CaCo-2 as well as one rabbit cell line, RK-13. This raises the possibility of the 
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1. Introduction  
 
The presence of emerging infectious diseases within the human population has increased 
significantly in the last decade (1). Of these emerging infectious diseases, approximately 60% 
are caused by zoonotic pathogens, that is, those originating from an animal source, the most 
common of which are viruses (2). Bat-borne viruses have been identified as the source of many 
of these deadly emerging zoonotic diseases, with bats hosting more of these viruses per species 
than any other mammalian order (3, 4). 
1.1 Bats as Viral hosts  
Despite the many viruses which have been identified having bats as their natural host, they 
rarely result in clinical symptoms in the bat host in either experimental or natural settings (5). 
Sporadic reports of symptomatic virus infection in bats do exist, mostly related to lyssaviruses, 
but this continues to be variable, with many animals remaining asymptomatic despite infection 
(6). Exactly why this is remains under debate. The distinctive life history traits of bats including 
longevity, echolocation, flight and unique immune responses may contribute to the success of 
bats as viral hosts (7). 
1.1.1 Longevity 
The extreme longevity of bats has been theorised to be a factor in the long-term persistence of 
viruses within bat populations. Bats live a minimum of three times longer than non-flying 
mammals of a similar size, with this longevity placing them outside the traditional regression 
line for mammals that relates life expectancy to the ratio of metabolic rate to body weight (8). 
While some studies have suggested that this could be due to the evolution of flight allowing for 
the evasion of predators, bats still exceed the lifespan of similarly sized birds, with one Brandt’s 
bat (Myotis brandti) weighing less than 10g living for more than 41 years in the wild. The 
maximum lifespan of similar sized birds has been approximated at 14 years (9). Long-term 
studies of Bechstein’s bat (Myotis bechsteinii) colonies have found that adult bats show no 
increase in mortality and no decrease in fertility until they reach significantly older ages, 
suggesting that bats demonstrate limited signs of senescence until advanced age. This study also 
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showed that persistent viral infection was not a predictor of mortality, with the only 
determinant of adult mortality being catastrophic weather events (10). These relatively long 
lifespans and continued reproduction into advanced age may facilitate viral persistence in 
chronic infections and allow for the production of offspring well into life, leading to a continued 
source of immunologically naïve animals.  
1.1.2 Social Systems  
Bats exhibit one of the most diverse ranges of social systems in mammals, often forming dense 
roosting colonies that sometimes consist of multiple bat species, and this can greatly potentiate 
the transmission of viruses (11). In the case of Mexican free-tailed bats (Tadarida brasiliensis), 
these colonies can be densely packed, with populations consisting of millions of individuals (12). 
It is in such conditions that the only example of airborne rabies virus transmission has been 
documented, demonstrating the ability of roosting behaviours to influence virus transmission 
(13). While the formation of colonies may increase virus transmission in the case of Mexican 
Free-Tailed bats, it may also act to increase the persistence of viruses. Bechstein’s bats form 
stable, closed maternal colonies, interrupted by males during the breeding season as is the 
pattern associated with temperate-zone species (14). It has been suggested that the formation 
of these closed maternal colonies may allow the persistence of pathogens throughout 
generations in the insular female group, while travelling males may cause pathogen transmission 
between colonies (7). This has been supported by further network analysis which demonstrated 
that gregarious behaviour among bats is more likely to result in intraspecies transmission and, 
in areas where multiple species of bats share roosts, interspecies transmission (15). Thus, it can 
be said that the social nature of bats may contribute to their success as viral hosts, by increasing 
their transmission of viruses to other naïve hosts.  
1.1.3 Flight 
The capability of flight also confers bats many advantages for viral spread. Powered flight allows 
the occupation of diverse habitats, contributing to species diversity and enabling the efficient 
spread of viruses to other ecological niches and colonies where native bats may be naïve to the 
pathogens carried. As well as this obvious increase in geographic range, flight also influences the 
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physiology of bats, possibly accounting for the low viremia and virulence levels shown during 
infection with many pathogens. One possible explanation for this is the “flight as fever” 
hypothesis that postulates that elevated core body temperatures due to the high metabolic rate 
necessary for flight mimics the effects of a fever response (16). However, this is controversial as 
a rise in temperature is not the only response which occurs during a fever, and currently no 
experimental evidence exists to support it (17). The high metabolic demand caused by powered 
flight has led to positive selection in oxidative phosphorylation pathways, an evolutionary tactic 
to increase metabolic capacity (18). The by-products of these oxidative metabolic pathways can 
have harmful side effects, such as the production of reactive oxygen species which cause DNA 
damage (18). Comparative analysis of the genomes of Pteropus alecto and Myotis davidii 
demonstrate a concentration of positively selected genes, such as c-REL, a member of the 
nuclear factor κB family (19). c-REL plays a diverse role in innate and adaptive immunity (see 
section 1.1.4) as well as a role in the DNA damage response through the upstream activation of 
ATM, which is involved in the DNA damage response and CLSPN, which is necessary for cell cycle 
arrest due to DNA damage. Thus the positive selection for genes to control DNA damage, such 
as c-REL, which also play a role in immunity, indicate that the adaptations necessary for flight 
may have inadvertently affected the immune system (19).  
1.1.4 Immune system 
The immune system of bats plays perhaps the most critical role in the coexistence of viruses 
without disease, however bat immunology is still an emerging field. It is important to note that 
much of the study of bat immunology has been conducted on just a few species of the Chiroptera 
order, which contains over 1,200 species (20). Because of this diversity, information obtained 
from one species does not necessarily relate to another. For example, the interferon gene locus 
has been contracted in Pteropus alecto, but expanded in Rousettus aegyptiacus (21, 22). These 
interferon (IFN) responses, act as a potent first line of defence against viral infection, preventing 
its spread, with type I IFNs, such as IFN-alpha, induced directly in response to viral infection (23). 
The contraction of the type I IFN family in P. alecto has resulted in the presence of fewer IFN 
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genes than any other mammal sequenced. Furthermore, the study also concluded that IFN-
alpha genes are constitutively expressed in unstimulated bat tissues, with their expression 
unaffected by viral infection (21). This constitutive production of the IFN-alpha protein leads to 
the induction of IFN-stimulated genes associated with antiviral activity and resistance to DNA 
damage, a system which may help bats to coexist asymptomatically with viruses (21). The 
expansion of the type I IFN family in R. aegyptiacus and lack of constitutive IFN-alpha expression 
has led to many questions about differences in the immune responses of individual species, as 
it now appears that different species may have novel modes of antiviral defence which allow 
coexistence with viruses (22).  
While the modifications to bat interferon systems allow for the control of viral infections, they 
also possess mechanisms to avoid the hyper-induction of inflammatory genes, which can cause 
hyper-inflammation leading to immunopathology in viral infections. In the case of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) in humans the body mounts an immune response against the virus, 
beginning with the expression of type I IFNs, which then stimulate various pro-inflammatory 
chemokines. When this inflammatory response fails to switch off, the hyper-induction of IFN 
stimulated chemokines leads to widespread immune dysregulation, causing severe immune 
mediated pathology and increased viral burden due to the lack of immune regulation, rather 
than as a direct response to viral infection (24). The recent establishment of bat primary cell 
lines has allowed further examination into their unique ability to avoid hyper-inflammation 
while hosting a great variety of viruses. Cells taken from Eptesicus fuscus have demonstrated 
the presence of an inhibitor molecule (cRel) binding site in the promoter region of tumour 
necrosis factor alpha (TNFalpha), a key inflammatory cytokine. Once stimulated with a double-
stranded DNA surrogate, cRel actively suppressed TNFalpha, thereby reducing the overall levels 
of inflammation (25). Inflammation is a complex system, and modifications have been found 
elsewhere, which may contribute to the reduction of inflammation. The nucleotide binding 
oligomerization domain like receptors (NLRs) family pyrin domain containing 3 (NLRP3) is a 
sensor which recognises viral and bacterial infections (26). Overactivity of the NLRP3 
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inflammasome is linked to the induction of a hyper-inflammatory state. A recent study using P. 
alecto primary cells found that bats dampened transcriptional priming, producing a lower 
functional capacity NLRP3, in response to sterile danger signals and zoonotic RNA viruses (27, 
28). By dampening this inflammation activation response, bats may be able to avoid the 
immunopathologies associated with excessive inflammation, contributing to their ability to 
remain asymptomatic viral reservoirs (27).  
1.2 Bat-borne Viruses and Human Disease  
The unique physiological traits of bats enable them to host a wide variety of viruses. This co-
infection of bat populations with various virus species has led to spill over events, causing 
infections in humans due to a variety of bat-borne zoonotic viruses, often through contact with 
a secondary amplifying reservoir host. These viral families have caused some of the most 
significant viral outbreaks within the last two decades (1).  
1.2.1 Rhabdoviridae 
The Lyssavirus genus (family Rhabdoviridae) contains the most widely studied bat-borne viruses, 
with rabies virus (RABV), belonging to genotype 1, one of the most commonly encountered. The 
Lyssavirus genera has been hypothesised to have originated in the Chiroptera order before a 
spillover event 906 to 1,477 years ago caused the emergence of rabies within the Carnivoran 
order (29). In America, RABV is associated with bats but also with terrestrial mammals in a 
sylvatic cycle. The rabies virus is shed in the saliva of clinically affected animals and transmitted 
through the inoculation of the virus via bites or scratches, resulting in neurological disease. 
RABV’s lack of host specificity appears to be the exception, rather than the rule, with all other 
lyssavirus species having a single host reservoir within the Chiropteran order (30).  
Australian bat lyssavirus (ABLV), belonging to genotype 7, is one of the 16 classified species of 
lyssavirus, and appears to be serologically and phylogenetically the most closely related of the 
old world lyssaviruses to RABV (31). ABLV is distinguished into two variants, the pteropid variant 
carried by four flying fox species and the insectivorous variant, to date only isolated from the 
yellow-bellied sheath-tailed bat (Saccolaimus flaviventris) (32, 33). Both ABLV variants have 
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been associated with clinical disease in the host species, with rare spill over events resulting in 
neurological disease in humans and horses (34-37). Spill over events appear to be rare due to 
the low prevalence (less than 1%) of ABLV in the healthy bat population, as well as the lack of a 
terrestrial reservoir (38, 39).  
1.2.2 Paramyxoviridae  
The significance of Paramyxoviruses first became evident in the 1990s with the occurrence of 
two zoonotic outbreaks in humans and animals. A new genus, Henipavirus, was proposed to 
encompass these two new zoonotic paramyxoviruses, Hendra virus (HeV) and Nipah virus (NiV). 
HeV was originally isolated in 1994 from equine lung tissue during the investigation of an 
outbreak of acute respiratory disease in Queensland (40). This initial outbreak caused the death 
of 13 affected horses and the infection of two humans, one of whom eventually succumbed to 
severe interstitial pneumonia. Subsequent investigation proved HeV was the etiological agent 
of the disease (41, 42). Since the initial outbreak cases have been detected sporadically with 
increasing frequency, with multiple cases detected in Queensland and New South Wales since 
2010 (43). After the identification of HeV as the etiological agent, seropositivity to HeV was 
detected in four species of Pteropid bats (44). Subsequent studies isolated HeV from the viscera 
and foetuses of two of these Pteropid species, confirming Pteropid bats as the natural reservoir 
host for HeV (45). It is currently accepted that urine is the primary source of HeV excretion in 
flying-foxes, with the most likely mode of transmission being equine contact with infected flying 
fox urine (46). Horse to horse transmission does infrequently occur when direct contact with 
infectious fluids occurs; however, human infection has only been as a consequence of direct 
contact with infected horses (47).  
NiV is the second virus belonging to the Henipavirus suborder and was first discovered during a 
concurrent outbreak of pigs with respiratory disease and humans with neurological disease in 
Malaysia in 1998 (48). The disease spread due to the movement of infected pigs through 
Malaysia and into Singapore, resulting in 276 human encephalitis cases, with 106 reported 
deaths (49). Upon isolation of a novel paramyxovirus with structural similarities to HeV as the 
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causal agent of the disease, suspicion immediately fell on Pteropid bats as the natural reservoir 
host (50). Neutralising antibodies were subsequently found in five species of Pteropid bats 
confirming the suspicion that they are the natural reservoir host for NiV, with the virus being 
transmitted to humans via pigs, a secondary amplifying host (51).  No further cases have been 
detected in Malaysia; however, regular outbreaks have occurred in Bangladesh since 2001 (52).  
Bangladesh has a small, low-density pig population, allowing pigs to be ruled out as the direct 
source of infection. Subsequent studies identified the consumption of NiV infected raw date 
palm sap as the primary infection source for bat to human transmission (53). Human to human 
transmission has been recorded in India and Bangladesh, raising NiV’s pandemic potential (54).  
1.2.3 Filoviridae  
The Ebolavirus genus consists of six separate species, of which four, Zaire ebolavirus, 
Bundibugyo virus, Tai Forest virus and Sudan ebolavirus have proved highly pathogenic for 
human and non-human primates, causing viral haemorrhagic fever (55). Since 1976 more than 
25 outbreaks of ebolaviruses have been recognised, the most significant occurring in Guinea, 
Sierra Leone and Liberia between 2013-2016, infecting an estimated 28,000 people and causing 
11,325 fatalities (56). The current natural reservoir of ebolaviruses remains elusive, though the 
accumulation of indirect evidence points to bats as the primary suspects. Several studies have 
found the presence of Zaire ebolavirus antibodies and viral RNA in fruit bats and free tailed bats, 
however despite the testing of thousands of individual bats, successful isolation of a Zaire 
ebolavirus replicative strain has not been achieved, preventing the confirmation of bats as the 
reservoir host (57-59).  
Viruses from the Marburgvirus genus (family Filoviridae) are also known to cause outbreaks of 
viral haemorrhagic fever. Most outbreaks of Marburg have involved either tourists or miners 
visiting caves in which bats have been known to roost. A recent study has confirmed the long-
suspected link between Marburg virus and the Egyptian Fruit Bat (Rousettus aegyptiacus) based 
on the isolation of the virus directly from wild caught specimens, confirming bats as the reservoir 
host (60). This discovery adds weight to the theory that bats may be the reservoir host for the 
8 
 
closely related ebolaviruses. Complete genome sequencing of a sixth ebolavirus, Bombali virus, 
in free tailed bats in Sierra Leone, as well as the discovery of a phylogenetically distinct filovirus, 
Měngla virus, in Rousettus bats in China has added strength to the argument that bats are the 
natural reservoir host of the other pathogenic ebolavirus species (61, 62). However the previous 
discovery of antibodies to Zaire ebolavirus in free tail bats further promotes the idea that future 
surveillance should be expanded from fruit bats to insectivorous bats (59).  
1.2.4 Coronaviridae  
Of the zoonotic bat-borne viruses, coronaviruses exhibit an increased propensity for interspecies 
transmission. The 2002 to 2003 pandemic of SARS was the first time that coronaviruses posed a 
significant threat to public health, with previously known human coronaviruses only associated 
with mild disease. In late 2002 reports began of cases of life-threatening respiratory disease with 
no identifiable cause in Guangdong Province, China (63). This infection quickly spread to Hong 
Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and Toronto (64). The etiological agent was subsequently determined 
to be a novel species in the genus Betacoronavirus, named later as SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) 
(65).  By the time all known chains of human to human transmission of SARS-CoV were broken 
there were 8,096 confirmed cases of infection, 774 of which were fatal (66). Epidemiological 
surveys determined that early SARS cases had a history of contact with animals through animal 
trade in wet markets or restaurants. Investigation of these wet markets detected SARS-CoV in a 
range of small mammals, and successfully isolated SARS-CoV like viruses from Himalayan palm 
civets (Paguma larvata), suggesting their role as a reservoir host (67). However, subsequent 
epidemiology studies did not find SARS-CoV in farmed or wild caught civets, deeming them more 
likely to be an incidental host than the natural reservoir (68). The role of palm civets as a 
secondary, incidental host is a similar situation to that of the Henipaviruses discussed previously, 
leading multiple research groups to the near-simultaneous finding of SARS-CoV like viruses in 
horseshoe bats (genus Rhinolophus), with a genome sequence identity of 87-92% to human or 
civet SARS-CoV isolates (69, 70). The discovery of this viral RNA furthered the theory that SARS-
CoV originated in bats; however, it wasn’t until the successful isolation of a live SARS-CoV like 
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virus from bat faecal samples in 2013 that the theory was confirmed (71). This isolated virus was 
termed WIV1 and shown to use the angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) receptor from 
humans, palm civets and horseshoe bats for cellular entry, the same receptor used by SARS, 
providing robust evidence for the bat origin of SARS-CoV (71). 
In 2012, ten years after the initial emergence of SARS, another novel coronavirus species in the 
genus Betacoronavirus emerged in the Middle East, initially isolated from the sputum of a 
patient with acute pneumonia and renal failure, and later deemed Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) (72). Unlike SARS, most early MERS cases were independent 
clusters limited to countries in the Middle East, with some cases reported in Africa and European 
countries in individuals travelling from the Middle East. The MERS outbreak is still ongoing, with 
a notable outbreak occurring in the Republic of Korea in 2015 which was characterised by 
hospital to hospital transmission (73). By the end of July 2019, there has been a total of 2,458 
laboratory-confirmed cases of MERS with 848 associated deaths in 27 countries (74). Most of 
the early MERS cases had contact with dromedary camels, with MERS-CoV strains isolated from 
them appearing almost identical to the strains isolated from initial human cases (75). In addition, 
antibodies specific to MERS-CoV were found in camel serum samples, some dating back to 1983 
(76). However, based on phylogenetic analysis the genetic diversity between camel and human 
viral strains is low, indicating that humans and camels have only been infected by MERS-CoV for 
a short time, with these infections both originating from the same source (77). Due to the 
identification of bats as the natural reservoir species in the previous SARS pandemic, immediate 
suspicion fell on bats as the originating source of MERS-CoV in humans and camels. MERS-CoV 
belongs to lineage C of the genus Betacoronavirus and is closely related to the Tylonycterus bat 
coronavirus HKU4, Pipistrellus bat coronavirus HKU5 and bat CoVs in Nycteris, suggesting a bat-
borne origin (78). Unlike SARS-CoV which recognises the ACE2 receptor, MERS-CoV uses the 
dipeptidyl peptidase 4 receptor (DPP4 also known as CD26), with the expression of both human 
and bat DPP4 in susceptible cells enabling viral entry (79). Bat DPP4 genes have been subject to 
significant adaptive evolution, suggestive of a long term association between MERS related CoVs 
10 
 
and bats (80). Phylogenetic analysis of closely related bat MERS-CoV supports the hypothesis 
that MERS-CoV originated from bats; however, there is a phylogenetic gap between the related 
bat MERS-CoV and the isolated human and camel MERS-CoV strains (77). This phylogenetic gap 
may be bridged with the discovery of other bat coronaviruses circulating in nature which 
contributed to the emergence of MERS-CoV in bats and camels (77).  
1.3 Bat-borne Viruses and Porcine Disease 
The risks bat-borne viruses pose are not just limited to humans, with four bat-borne viruses 
currently known to cause disease in pigs. Three of these viruses have been confirmed to have 
originated in bats: NiV, Menangle virus and the Alphacoronavirus swine acute diarrhea 
syndrome-coronavirus (SADS-CoV). A second Alphacoronavirus is suspected to have originated 
from bats, porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) (81).  
1.3.1 Menangle Virus 
Menangle virus (MenPV) is a zoonotic paramyxovirus first isolated in 1997 from stillborn piglets 
at a commercial piggery in New South Wales (82). The affected piggery experienced a decrease 
in the farrowing rate from the expected 82% to 60%, a decrease in the number of live piglets 
born and an increase in the proportion of mummified and stillborn piglets, some with 
deformities (82). Upon isolation of MenPV from samples of affected piglets the investigation of 
the source of the viral infection began. The presence of a large breeding colony of grey-headed 
fruit bats (Pteropus poliocephalus) and little red fruit bats (Pteropus scapulatus) roosting within 
200 m of the affected piggery before the outbreak of Menangle led to the investigation of fruit 
bats as a potential source of infection. Serological surveys found MenPV neutralizing antibodies 
in grey-headed fruit bats, black flying foxes (Pteropus alecto), and spectacled flying foxes 
(Pteropus conspicillatus) in both pre and post outbreak serum samples, suggesting that fruit bats 
were the reservoir host for MenPV (82). An attempt to successfully isolate MenPV from bat 
samples was made in 2008, however despite the observation of paramyxovirus like particles in 
collected faecal samples and strong serological evidence of infection with MenPV, no virus was 
successfully isolated (83). It wasn’t until 2012 that MenPV was successfully isolated from urine 
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samples of the black flying fox. Genomic analysis of this bat virus isolate (bMenPV) compared to 
the pig isolate (pMenPV) found an overall nucleotide sequence identity of 94%, with researchers 
concluding that bMenPV and pMenPV were two strains of the same virus species (84). 
1.3.2 Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea Virus  
PEDV was first determined as the etiological agent for porcine epidemic diarrhea (PED) in feeder 
and fattening pigs in Belgium in 1978 (85). Outbreaks of PED have occurred in multiple European 
and Asian countries, with PED documented in China since the 1980s, however variant strains of 
PEDV associated with large scale diarrhea outbreaks with 80 to 100% morbidity and 50 – 90% 
mortality in suckling piglets have emerged in China since 2010 (86, 87). Until 2013 PEDV was 
considered exotic to the United States, however since then, PEDV has swept through the United 
States, wiping out more than 10% of America’s pig population in less than a year (88). The full-
length genomic sequence for the prototype Belgian strain (CV777) was determined in 2001, 
placing PEDV in the alphacoronavirus genus along with porcine transmissible gastroenteritis 
coronavirus (TGEV) and bat coronavirus 512/2005 (BtCoV/512/2005) (89). Subsequent 
phylogenetic analysis of CV777 determined that it was more closely related to BtCoV/512/2005 
than TGEV in both phylogeny and genome organisation, suggesting that PEDV may have 
originated from bats (90). Unfortunately no large scale surveillance data exists to definitively 
confirm the introduction of PEDV into the pig population from bats in the 1970s; however, cell 
tropism studies have determined that PEDV is capable of infecting bat lung cells, adding support 
to the theory that PEDV originated from bats (91). 
1.3.3 Swine Acute Diarrhea Syndrome Coronavirus  
Swine acute diarrhea syndrome (SADS) first emerged in October 2016 in the Guangdong 
province of China (92). Four pig breeding farms in the area were suffering from the outbreak, 
initially suspected to be caused by PEDV. However, by January 2017 PEDV could no longer be 
detected despite accelerating mortality rates of up to 90% in piglets five days or younger. 
Further investigation led to the identification of a novel HKU2-related bat coronavirus, named 
SADS-CoV as the etiological agent of SADS. The SADS-CoV isolates taken from the four farms 
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affected were almost identical, sharing 95% overall genome identity with the Rhinolophus bat 
coronavirus HKU2, suggesting a bat origin for this porcine virus. Despite this the genome identity 
of the spike protein sequence, responsible for viral binding to cell receptors, was only 86%, 
suggesting that HKU2 was not the direct progenitor of SADS-CoV, but that they may share a 
common ancestor. SADS related CoVs were detected in 9.8% of anal swabs collected from 
various Rhinolophus species in the Guangdong province. These SADS related CoVs have a 96-
98% sequence identity to SADS-CoV, with genetic diversity in the spike gene ranging between 
72-92% nucleotide and 80-98% amino acid identity to SADS-CoV (92). 
1.4 Coronavirus spike proteins and cell tropism 
Coronaviruses such as SADS-CoV, PEDV, SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV are enveloped, positive-
stranded RNA viruses, possessing the largest genome among all RNA viruses, ranging from 27 to 
32kb. This large genome is packed inside a helical capsid formed by the nucleocapsid protein 
which is then surrounded by an envelope. Associated with this viral envelope are three structural 
proteins; the membrane protein and the envelope protein, both of which are involved in viral 
assembly, and the spike protein which mediates viral entry into host cells, is responsible for 
membrane fusion and is a critical determinant of viral host range and tissue tropism (Figure 1) 
(93).  
The coronavirus spike protein is a member of the class I viral membrane fusion proteins and 
consists of three segments; a large ectodomain, a single pass transmembrane anchor, and a 
short intracellular tail (93). The ectodomain consists of a receptor binding subunit S1, which 
binds to host cell receptors during viral attachment, and a membrane-fusion subunit S2, which 
fuses the host and viral membranes to allow the viral genome entry into the cell (94). Electron 
microscopy has revealed that the spike itself is a homotrimer with three S1 heads and a trimeric 
S2 stalk, producing the distinctive spike structure seen on the surface of the virus (Figure 1) (95). 
Two major domains exist in the coronavirus S1 subunit, the N-terminal domain (S1-NTD) and the 
C-terminal domain (S1-CTD), with one or both of these domains functioning as the receptor 
binding domain (RBD) (Figure 1) (94). These two domains have different functions with the S1-
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NTD responsible for binding sugars and proteins and the S1-CTD domain recognising protein 
receptors such as ACE2 and DPP4.  
 
 
Figure 1. Coronaviruses and their spike proteins. A. Diagram of a coronavirus virion depicting 
the main structural proteins. B. Schematic of the overall structure of prefusion coronavirus 
spike proteins. Shown are the receptor binding subunit S1 N-terminal and C-terminal domains 
(S1-NTD, S1-CTD), the membrane-fusion subunit S2, the transmembrane anchor (TM), the 
cytoplasmic tail (Cyto) and the viral envelope. C. Schematic of the domain structure of the 
spike protein showing the S1 and S2 regions, transmembrane domain (TM) and the 
cytoplasmic tail (Cyto). Adapted from Li (2013) and Li (2016).   
 
1.4.1 SARS-CoV and ACE2 
The SARS-CoV S1-CTD complexes with the human ACE2 receptor, a zinc-dependent 
carboxypeptidase, to provide the virus entry into human cells (96). The SARS-CoV S1-CTD 
contains two subdomains; a core structure and a receptor binding motif (RBM). The core 
structure consists of a five-stranded antiparallel beta sheet. An extended loop is present on one 
edge of the core structure, forming a gently concave outer surface with two ridges on both sides 
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and a two-stranded antiparallel beta sheet in the middle. It is this extended loop which makes 
contact with ACE2 and thus has been deemed the RBM (97).  
Research on the interactions between the SARS-CoV RBM and ACE2 has provided insight into 
how SARS-CoV managed to make the cross-species jump. During the SARS epidemic highly 
similar SARS-CoV strains were isolated from both human patients and palm civets in nearby wet 
markets, originally leading scientists to identify palm civets as the reservoir host of SARS (67). 
These highly similar SARS-CoV strains only differed by two amino acid residues in the RBM region 
of the S1-CTD, changing from Lys 479 Asn and Ser 487 Thr between the palm civet viral strains 
and the human viral strains (98). These residues at positions 479 and 487 interact closely with 
two virus binding hotspots on the human ACE2, which contribute critically to virus-receptor 
binding, placing the residues under selective pressure. Early civet SARS-CoV isolates were 
prevented from entering human cells due to imbalanced salt bridges at the hydrophobic 
virus/receptor interface present in these hotspots (99). Two naturally occurring viral mutations 
in the S1-CTD; Lys 479 Asp and Ser 487 Thr strengthen these hotspot structures by removing 
unfavourable free charges at the virus-receptor interface, enhancing the binding affinity of the 
S1-CTD for human ACE2 (100). These mutations consequently played an important role in 
allowing the civet-to-human and human-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV to occur during 
the epidemic. The identification of SARS-like CoVs, proved that SARS originated from bats, with 
palm civets acting as an intermediate host (70, 71). Investigation of these SARS-like CoVs has 
shown that their spike proteins are capable of allowing the virus to enter primary human airway 
cells and bat cells; however, the structural details of which mutations they possess to allow them 
to interact have yet to be determined (71). 
These studies on the interactions between SARS-CoV and ACE2 reveal that one or a few 
mutations in viral RBDs can change the viral tropism, producing epidemic outcomes. Similarly, 
one or a few residue variations in receptor homologs in different animal species can form 
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barriers preventing the cross-species transmission of viruses. Thus, the genetic makeup of the 
spike protein is critically important for the tropism of coronaviruses.  
1.4.2 MERS-CoV and DPP4 
The Betacoronavirus MERS-CoV S1-CTD complexes with DPP4, a serine exoprotease which 
functions in immune regulation, signal transduction and apoptosis (101). The MERS-CoV RBD is 
structurally similar to SARS, with both of them containing two subdomains, a core structure and 
an RBM. But whilst the core structure of the two viruses is very similar, their RBMs are markedly 
different. The MERS-CoV RBM consists of a four-stranded antiparallel beta sheet, which presents 
a flat surface for binding to the DPP4 receptor, a critical contrast to the loop dominated, concave 
surface of the SARS-CoV RBM (102). The variations of viral binding motif (VBM) residues on DPP4 
homologs can pose a barrier for the binding of MERS-CoV spike proteins, preventing cross-
species transmission. For example the variation of VBM residues on DPP4 homologs present in 
mouse and rat species disfavour RBM binding, making both of them poor receptors for MERS-
CoV (103, 104). In contrast the conserved VBM residues of the camel DPP4 make it an effective 
receptor for MERS-CoV, allowing camel species to act as viral hosts for MERS-CoV (105). This has 
been confirmed by the successful isolation of MERS from camels leading to the theory that 
camels were the primary reservoir host of MERS-CoV (75). However, since the isolation of MERS-
CoV like viruses from bats, some of which (HKU4) utilise DPP4 as a receptor through a similar 
structural mechanism as MERS-CoV, bats have been considered as a more likely reservoir host 
(78, 106). The comparison between SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV has shown that viral RBDs with a 
conserved core structure can still recognise different receptors due to structural variations in 
their RBM, reinforcing the concept that receptor recognition by the spike protein is a critical 
determinant of viral host ranges.  
1.4.3 PEDV and APN  
Unlike SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, PEDV exhibits promiscuous binding to cell receptors (91). PEDV 
was once thought to recognise both porcine and human aminopeptidase N proteins (APN) as its 
functional receptor, as well as utilising sialic acid as its coreceptor, giving it enteric tropism (91, 
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107). However further research suggests that porcine APN is not a functional receptor for PEDV, 
instead contributing to cell entry through its protease activity (108). This has been confirmed by 
a recent study in which APN knockout pigs remained susceptible to PEDV infection, as well as 
the production of APN-knockout Vero cells which remained susceptible to PEDV, despite the lack 
of a supposed functional receptor (109). Furthermore the binding of sialic acid appears to be 
strain specific, making the actual receptor for PEDV unknown (81). Despite this, tropism studies 
have determined that PEDV is capable of infecting pig kidney cells, human liver and lung, monkey 
kidney and bat lung cells (91).  
1.5 Lentivirus Pseudotyping 
The cellular tropism of a virus is determined by the susceptibility of host cells and the presence 
of the receptor needed by the virus for cell entry, as well as the permissiveness of these cells to 
allow virus replication. The accessibility of these susceptible and permissive cells is also an 
important determinant along with the innate immune response of the host, which may restrict 
viral replication in a host species-specific manner (110). For CoVs host tropism and the ability to 
make cross-species jumps are determined by the susceptibility of the host cells to infection, with 
the spike protein appearing to be the main determinant in initial cross-species infection events 
(93).  
In order to traditionally evaluate the host range of novel CoVs, a replicating isolated strain of the 
virus is necessary. It has been proven multiple times that despite genomic and serological 
evidence suggesting the presence of a virus in a host, the virus remains impossible or 
exceedingly difficult to isolate (55, 83). Thus, methods to explore the cell tropisms of these 
viruses, without isolated virus copies are necessary. Secondly, any novel virus with unknown 
pathogenicity must be contained in at Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) or higher, a level of containment 
that is not always available to researchers. The use of a pseudotyping method allows the species 
tropism of the virus to be investigated without an isolated copy of the virus, in conventional 
biosafety conditions (111). Viral pseudotyping involves the production of a recombinant viral 
particle whose core and structural proteins are derived from a different virus than the envelope 
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proteins (112). These pseudoviral envelope proteins have a high similarity to the native envelope 
proteins which they are derived from, and can effectively mediate viral entry into host cells; 
however, the pseudovirus itself is replication incompetent and cannot produce infectious 
particles (113).  
Several packaging systems are used to create pseudotyped viruses, with lentiviral based vectors 
often used due to their ability to integrate into both dividing and non-dividing cells (114). These 
lentiviral pseudotyped systems, in particular, the use of vectors derived from human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV-1), have been employed for the investigation of novel 
coronaviruses and their cell tropisms within conventional biosafety conditions (115-118). These 
HIV-1 packaging systems involve the selective cloning of HIV genes into two to four plasmids, 
which act as DNA vectors. Because these lentiviral vectors are derived from the HIV-1 pathogen 
biosafety remains a concern as there is the possibility of generating replication-competent 
lentiviruses through the recombination of delivered and endogenous viral elements in producer 
cell lines (119).  
1.5.1 First Generation Recombinant Lentiviral Vectors  
In order to mitigate the risk of generating replication-competent lentiviruses, the first 
generation HIV-1 based recombinant lentiviral vectors split the HIV genome into three separate 
plasmids: a packaging plasmid which expresses HIV Gag, Pol and regulatory/accessory proteins; 
an envelope plasmid expressing a viral glycoprotein; and a transfer plasmid which encodes for 
the proteins necessary for reverse transcription, packaging and integration but not HIV protein 
expression (Figure 2) (120). This separation of the genomic components responsible for viral 
DNA packaging from the genomic components which activate them prevents the packaging 
sequences from incorporating into the viral genome, preventing the virus from reproducing 
after infection of a host cell (121).  
1.5.2 Second Generation Recombinant Lentiviral Vectors  
However, despite these safety measures, the first generation recombinant lentiviral vectors still 
posed a biosafety risk due to the presence of the viral accessory proteins; Vif, Vpu, Vpr and Nef. 
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Whilst these viral accessory proteins are important for HIV replication in primary cells, they are 
not essential for lentiviral function, prompting the development of second generation 
recombinant lentiviral vectors where they were removed (122). Thus these second generation 
systems only had four of the nine HIV genes; gag, pol, rev and tat (Figure 2) (123). Despite these 
changes the second-generation lentivirus system is not without its flaws, due to the existence 
of long terminal repeats (LTRs). These LTRs flank the transgene cassette which is integrated into 
the host genome (124). However, their existence can give rise to potential hazards. 
Recombination events leading to the production of replication competent lentiviruses can allow 
these viruses to replicate in a similar manner to wild type viruses. As these LTRs also possess a 
promoter region and a binding site for host transcription factors the integration of these LTRs 
into the host genome can activate adjacent cellular genes which may be proto-oncogenes (124).  
1.5.3 Third Generation Recombinant Lentiviral Vectors  
To further enhance the safety of the second generation systems, third generation recombinant 
self-inactivating lentiviral vectors were developed. In these third generation systems the U3 
region of the 3’-LTR is deleted. This deletion is then copied into the 5’-LTR promoter and 
enhancer region of the integrated genome in reverse transcription, resulting in the 
transcriptional inactivation of potentially packageable viral genome in the host cell (113). 
Secondly the packaging plasmid is separated into two separate plasmids, one incorporating rev 
and the other incorporating gag and pol (Figure 2). Tat and rev are both necessary for HIV-1 
replication as they regulate viral transcription and the nuclear export of transcripts (125). To 
decrease the risk of replication competent lentiviruses formation tat is deleted from the third 
generation packaging plasmid, and its function replaced through the replacement of the U3 
promoter region in the 5’-LTR of the transfer plasmid with another strong viral promoter (126). 
The splitting of the third generation vector system into four separate plasmids, decreases the 
chances of replication competent HIV-1 like virus formation as at least three recombination 
events would be required for this to occur. However, these safety enhancements could come at 
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a cost as when compared to the second generation three plasmid system, the virus yield may be 
lower (127).  
 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of HIV-1 derived lentiviral vectors. A. First generation 
recombinant lentiviral vectors. B. Second generation recombinant lentiviral vectors. C. Third 
generation recombinant lentiviral vectors. Adapted from 
https://www.abmgood.com/marketing/knowledge_base/The_Lentivirus_System.php 
 
1.5.4 Reporter genes 
After the creation of a pseudotyped lentivirus and its subsequent inoculation onto a cell line it 
is important to determine whether viral entry and transduction of a cell has occurred. Various 
reporter genes, usually located on the transfer plasmid, enable the visualisation and 
quantification of this event. Luciferase is an enzyme commonly used as a reporter gene. 
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Following pseudoviral entry and cell transduction luciferase is produced, allowing viral entry to 
be quantified by lysing the cells, releasing the luciferase and allowing it to catalyse a chemical 
reaction in which luciferin is converted to oxyluciferin with light released as a by-product (128). 
The enzymatic activity of the luciferase can then be measured using a luminometer. Another 
reporter gene which is often used is green fluorescent protein (GFP). GFP emits a bright green 
fluorescence during exposure to blue light (450-490nm), allowing it to be detected by 
fluorescent microscopy and quantitated by manual counting of cells or fluorescence activated 
cell sorting (129). GFP can be expressed by the cell without cytotoxic effect and can be visualised 





This project aims to develop a second generation lentiviral pseudotyping system for the 
investigation of cell tropism of novel bat-borne coronaviruses. The system will be tested using a 
novel coronavirus deemed CoV1087. This virus was recently discovered in the bat species 
Chalinolobus gouldii, an endemic Australian microbat species, and possesses a 70% genetic 
similarity at both the coding RNA and amino acid level between its spike protein and that of 
PEDV strain CH-HNYF-14. The previous finding of SADS-CoV, which had a 86% similarity in its 
spike protein to its parent virus HKU2, led to the hypotheses that CoV1087 may be able to enter 
porcine cells (92). However, as CoV1087 has not been successfully isolated traditional methods 
of cell tropism analysis cannot be used.  
Thus, this study aims to;  
1) To develop a second generation lentivirus pseudotype system expressing the vesicular 
stomach virus G (VSV-G) surface protein to allow GFP expression in mammalian cell 
lines, and to act as a positive control in cell tropism experiments.  
2) To develop a second generation lentivirus pseudotype system expressing the spike 
protein from the novel coronavirus, CoV1087 which expresses GFP upon successful viral 
entry.  
3) To assess the cell tropism of CoV1087 using the second generation pseduotype system 




2. Materials and Methods  
 
2.1 Gene Construct 
A construct of the CoV1087 spike protein gene was developed with the restriction sites EcoRV 
(GATATC) at the 5’ termini and NotI (GCGGCCGC) at the 3’ termini for cloning into the 
pCDNA3.1(+) vector. A Kozac sequence was also engineered into the 5’ termini to provide 
initiation for translation into protein (Appendix I). This gene construct was supplied to Biomatik 
(Canada), for the synthesis of the CoV1087-pCDNA3.1(+) vector (Table 1).  
`2.2 Plasmids 




Plasmid Function Key Gene Function Classes Source   
pMD2.G Envelope plasmid 
containing VSV 
glycoprotein gene  
Ampicillin resistance, CMV 
Promoter, poly A sequence, 





Packaging plasmid Ampicillin resistance, CMV 
promoter, HIV-1 gag/pol 
protein, HIV-1 rev responsive 
element (RRE), SV40 ori 
Addgene (United 
States) #8455 
pHIVEGFP Transfer plasmid Ampicillin resistance, CMV 
promoter, EF-1 α promoter, 
IRES sequence, Enhanced 
GFP protein, HIV-1 rev 





Transfer plasmid Ampicillin resistance, CMV 
promoter, CopGFP protein, 
HIV-1 rev responsive 
element (RRE), Woodchuck 
hepatitis virus post 
transcriptional regulatory 
element (WPRE), polyA 
sequence, SV40 ori 
Stanford University 









Neomycin resistance, CMV 
promoter, Coronavirus spike 






The plasmids pMD2.G (Figure 3), pCMV-dr8.2dvpr (Figure 4) and pHIVEGFP (Figure 5) were 
obtained in transformed Escherichia coli as agar stabs (Table 1). The E. coli was streaked out 
onto Luria Bertani (LB) agar + 50 µg/ml ampicillin and incubated at 37°C overnight.  
The pPS-CMV-copGFP plasmid (Figure 6) was obtained as dried DNA on filter paper (Table 1). 
For reconstitution and propagation of the plasmid, the filter paper was immersed in 100 µl TE 
buffer and mixed. Stbl3 One Shot E.coli (Invitrogen, United States) was transformed with 
CoV1087-pCDNA3.1(+) plasmid (Figure 7) along with pPS-CMV-copGFP. Briefly, 2 µl of each 
purified plasmid was added to separate vials of Stbl3 One Shot E. coli cells (Table 1 and Figure 
3). The Stbl3 One Shot E. coli were incubated on ice for 30 minutes and then heat shocked at 
42°C for 45 seconds. The vials were then removed and placed on ice for 2 minutes. After removal 
from ice, 250 µl prewarmed super optimal broth (Invitrogen, United States) was added to each 
vial and the vials incubated on a shaker at 225 rpm for 1 hour at 37°C. The resulting 
transformation mix was then removed from the incubator, and 50 µl spread on a prewarmed 
selective LB agar + 50 µg/ml ampicillin plate, and then incubated overnight at 37°C. 
A single bacterial colony was inoculated into 10 ml of LB broth + 100 µg/ml ampicillin and 
incubated overnight in a shaking rack at 225 rpm at 37°C. The following day bacterial cell pellets 
were harvested by centrifuging cultures at 10,000 g for 5 minutes and removing the supernatant.  
Plasmids were extracted using the GeneJet Plasmid Mini Prep kit (Thermo Fisher, United States) 
as per manufacturer’s instructions. The resulting purified plasmid DNA was quantified using a 
QuBit™ dsDNA HS assay kit (Invitrogen, United States) and stored at -80°C.  
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Figure 3. pMD2.G, VSV envelope plasmid with key features annotated 
 





Figure 5. pHIVEGFP, transfer plasmid with key features annotated 
                    
 




Figure 7. CoV1087-pCDNA3.1(+), plasmid containing CoV1087 spike gene with key features 
annotated 
 
2.2.1 Sanger Sequencing CoV1087-pCDNA3.1(+) 
Sanger sequencing was conducted on the plasmid CoV1087-pCDNA3.1(+) to ensure correct 
insertion of the CoV1087 spike gene sequence into the vector supplied by Biomatik. An 
approximately 500bp section of the plasmid spanning the insertion site of the CoV1087 spike 
gene was amplified by PCR using the primer pair CMV Fwd (5’-CGCAAATGGGCGGTAGGCGTGT-3’) 
and Spike Rev (5’-CCAAGCAGTTGCGCCAGGATTGC-3’). The PCR reaction was carried out in a 25 µl 
reaction volume containing 250 nm of each primer, 2.5 µl of template DNA, 12.5 µl of 2x master 
mix and 8 µl of nuclease free water. The reaction mixture was amplified with 40 cycles, each 
consisting of 15 s at 95°, 30 s at 55° and 75 s at 72° in a SimpliAmp Thermal Cycler (Thermo 
Fisher, United States). The amplified product was visualised using gel electrophoresis in a 1.5% 
agarose gel and the subsequently formed DNA band extracted from the gel and submitted to 
the Australian Genome Research Facility (Australia) for Sanger sequencing.  
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2.3 Cell Culture  
293T cells (Catalogue #CRL-3216) were obtained from the American Type Culture Collection 
(ATCC). Immortal cell lines including CaCo-2, Porcine kidney-15 (PK-15), Rabbit kidney 13 (RK-
13), Chlorocebus aethiops kidney (Vero) and primary cell lines including equine lung (EL), and 
foetal porcine kidney (FPK), were propagated from in-house cell stocks.  Cells were cultured in 
75 cm2 flasks (Nunc, United States) with Dulbecco’s modified Eagle’s Medium (DMEM)(Gibco, 
United States), supplemented with 5% foetal calf serum (FCS), 1% L-glutamine (Sigma-Aldrich, 
Australia) and 1% penicillin/streptomycin solution (Sigma-Aldrich, Australia) unless otherwise 
stated. The cell cultures were maintained in a Forma Scientific incubator at 37°C, with 5% CO2 
until they reached 80% confluence. Once grown to 80% confluency, the cells were either 
passaged or seeded into plates for inoculation.  
Cells were passaged by detaching them from the flask by trypsinisation. The cell monolayers 
were washed twice in phosphate buffered saline (PBS), followed by the addition of 2 ml of 1% 
trypsin (Difco, United States) before incubation at 37°C for 5 minutes or until the cell monolayer 
detached from the bottom of the flask. Following detachment 5 ml of culture medium was 
added to inactivate the trypsin, and the cells subsequently removed by pipette and added into 
a new flask in a dilution of 1:2, 1:5 or 1:10. For seeding into plates, 5 ml of culture medium was 
added to inactivate the trypsin and a cell count performed as per the method below. The 
appropriate number of cells for the required seeding density were removed and suspended in 
the appropriate amount of media needed for plating (2 ml/well for a 6-well plate).  
2.3.2 Cell Counts  
Cell counts were performed manually using a Brightline haemocytometer. A mixture of 50 µl of 
trypsinised cells and 50 µl of trypan blue was prepared and applied to the haemocytometer until 
both chambers under the coverslip were full. The number of live unstained cells in one set of 16 
squares was then counted. This was performed once for each chamber and the average number 
of cells used to determine the number of viable cells per ml for plating.  
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2.4 VSV-G Pseudotyped Lentivirus Production  
To produce VSV-G pseudotyped lentivirus, 293T cells were seeded into a 6-well plate (Nunc, 
United States) at a density of 7.0 x 105 cells per well in 2 ml of antibiotic free culture media. The 
293T cells were then incubated for 17 hours at 37°C in 5% CO2 until the target cell confluency of 
80% was reached.  
In order to compare the effectiveness of the transfer plasmids pHIVEGFP and pPS-CMV-copGFP, 
two different VSV-G pseudotyped lentiviruses were produced, one using pHIVEGFP as the 
transfer plasmid and the other with pPS-CMV-copGFP.  The DNA mixture for transfection was 
prepared by combining equimolar amounts of each of the three plasmids to a total amount of 2 
µg of plasmid DNA per well (Table 2). The plasmid DNA mix was added to 50 µl of DMEM with 
no supplementation and briefly vortexed. To a separate 50 µl of DMEM, 6 µl of polyethylenimine 
(PEI) Transporter™ 5 transfection reagent (Polysciences, United States) was added and briefly 
vortexed. The PEI solution and the DNA solution were then combined to produce a PEI to 
plasmid DNA ratio of 3:1, vortexed for 5 seconds and incubated at room temperature for 15 
minutes. Following incubation 100 µl of the plasmid DNA/PEI mixture was added directly to the 
cell culture media in each well of a 6-well plate. The plates were incubated at 37°C, 5% CO2 for 









Table 2. Plasmid mixes used for the production of VSV-G and CoV1087 pseudotyped 
lentiviruses 
 Viral construct name  Plasmids used for production  Amount of plasmid DNA 



































The plates were then incubated for a further 24 hours at which point they were examined and 
photographed using a Nikon Diaphot inverted tissue culture microscope (Nikon, Japan) to check 
transfection efficiency and compare the fluorescence produced by the two viral constructs. At 
48 hours post-transfection the first viral harvest was performed by carefully removing the virus 
containing media from the well without disturbing the cell monolayer and replacing it with 2 ml 
of DMEM supplemented with 5% FCS and 1% L-Glutamine. The removed media was then placed 
in a 2 ml tube and centrifuged at 3000 g for 3 minutes to pellet any cell debris and the remaining 
supernatant decanted and aliquoted for storage at -80°C.  
The harvesting process was then repeated at 72 hours post media change for a second viral 




Figure 8. Simplified workflow for the production of unconcentrated and concentrated 
pseudotyped lentivirus production. 
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2.5 CoV1087 Spike Protein pseudotyped lentivirus production  
To produce the CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus the above method to produce VSV-G 
pseudotyped lentivirus was followed using the plasmid DNA mix outlined in Table 2 for the 
unconcentrated CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus construct. 
In order to produce enough CoV1087 pseudotyped virus to concentrate, production was then 
scaled up from 6-well plates to T175 flasks (Nunc, United States). A total of 36.4 µg of plasmid 
DNA was added per T175 flask in the ratios outlined in Table 2 for the concentrated CoV1087 
pseudotyped lentivirus viral construct. This plasmid DNA mix was combined with 910 µl of non-
supplemented DMEM. A separate 910 µl of non-supplemented DMEM was then combined with 
109.2 µl of PEI transporter and the mixture briefly vortexed. The PEI and plasmid DNA solutions 
were then combined, giving a PEI:DNA ratio of 3:1, and incubated at room temperature for 15 
minutes before being added to the 293T cells. This scaling allowed 50 ml of CoV1087S 
pseudotyped lentivirus supernatant to be harvested at 48 hours and 72 hours in comparison to 
the 12 ml produced in a single 6-well plate. After harvesting, the viral containing supernatant 
was filtered using a 0.45 µm syringe filter to remove cellular debris (see simplified workflow 
diagram in Figure 8). 
2.5.1 Concentration of CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus pilot test   
A pilot trial of the concentration of CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus was conducted by 
centrifuging 5 ml of CoV1087S pseudotyped lentivirus at 17,000 g for 90 minutes in a Heraeus 
Pico 17 microcentrifuge (Thermo Fisher, United States). The supernatant was then removed and 
the pseudotyped lentivirus pellet resuspended in 250 µl of DMEM with no additives. 
2.5.2 Concentration of CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus by ultrafiltration  
The virus supernatant collected from the mass CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus production was 
concentrated 10-fold by ultrafiltration using a 100K MWCO MicroSep™ Advance Centrifugal 
Device (Pall Corporation, United States) at 1250 g in an Eppendorf 5804R centrifuge (Eppendorf, 
Germany) at 4°C (see simplified workflow diagram in Figure 8). The flow through from the 
ultrafiltration was also collected in case of virus passing through the filter and concentrated by 
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centrifugation at 18000 g for 2 hours in an Avanti J25I centrifuge using a JS-24.38 swinging 
bucket rotor (Beckman Coulter, United States).  
2.6 Pseudotyped Lentivirus Infections 
In preparation for infections, cell lines were plated in 6-well plates at an appropriate cell density, 
with antibiotic free culture media and incubated overnight at 37°C in 5% CO2 until they reached 
80% confluency. To remove any serum from the cell culture which may interfere with the cell 
entry of the virus, the cells were washed by removing the cell culture media and then adding 
and removing 1 ml of prewarmed PBS. After washing, 450 µl of harvested, supernatant 
containing virus was then added and incubated with the cells for 1 hour at 37°C. Following this 
incubation 2 ml of antibiotic free culture media was added to each well and the plates incubated 
for 48 hours at 37°C, 5% CO2. At 72 hours post-infection the cells were examined with a Nikon 
Diaphot inverted tissue culture microscope and photographs were taken in both brightfield and 
fluorescent views. 
Initial infections were conducted as per the above process in 293T cells with both the VSV-G 
pseudotyped lentivirus constructed with pHIVEGFP and the one constructed with pPS-CMV-
copGFP to determine which viral construct produced the optimal amount of fluorescence to be 
used as a positive control (Table 2), and to be used in subsequent pseudotyped lentivirus 
construction.  
2.6.1 Pseudotyped CoV1087 lentivirus infections  
Initial infections of CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus were conducted as described in Section 2.6 
in 293T, CaCo-2, EL, FPK, PK-15 and Vero cells using the VSV-G pseudotyped lentivirus created 
with the transfer plasmid pPS-CMV-copGFP, as a positive control, with the other four wells 
containing unconcentrated CoV1087 pseudotyped virus (see simplified workflow diagram in 
Figure 9). 
Following the initial infections, a pilot study using the concentrated CoV1087 pseudotyped 
lentivirus (see Section 2.5.1) was conducted as described in Section 2.6, with 250 µl of 20-fold 
concentrated CoV1087 lentivirus applied to 293T cells in a 6-well plate at 80% confluency.  
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Final infections of 293T, CaCo-2, FPK, PK-15, RK-13 and Vero cells were plated at an appropriate 
cell density in 6-well plates, with antibiotic-free cell culture media and incubated overnight at 
37°C and 5% CO2 until they reached 80% confluency. The infections were performed as 
described in Section 2.6, with 500 µl of VSV-G pseudotyped lentivirus as the positive control, 
500 µl of ultrafiltered concentrated CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus and 500 µl of concentrated 
ultrafiltration flow through (see Section 2.5.2). Each infection was performed in duplicate.  
At 72 hours post-infection the cells were fixed in 4% paraformaldehyde (Sigma-Aldrich, 
Australia) by removing the media and gently washing them twice with prewarmed PBS, before 
adding 1 ml of 4% paraformaldehyde and incubating the cells at room temperature for 10 
minutes. The paraformaldehyde was then removed, and the cells gently washed in PBS before 
being allowed to dry. Photographs were then taken using a Nikon Digital Sight DS Vi1 camera 
and NIS Elements Advanced Research software, in combination with a Nikon Eclipse TS100 




Figure 9. Simplified workflow for the infection of 293T, CaCo-2, EL, FPK, PK-15 and Vero cells 
with unconcentrated VSV-G pseudotyped lentivirus and unconcentrated CoV1087 





2.7 Electron Microscopy 
A 1 ml sample of the cell culture supernatant harvest from the CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus 
preparation was clarified for electron microscopy by centrifugation at 10,000 g for two minutes. 
The resulting supernatant was then filtered using a 0.45 µm syringe filter and made up to 12 ml 
with ultrapure water. This clarified sample was then concentrated by centrifuging it at 155,000 
g for 2 hours, with the resulting supernatant discarded and the virus pellet left to dry for 30 
seconds before being resuspended in 50 µl of ultrapure water. The concentrated sample was 
then fixed to a formvar grid and negatively stained with 2% ammonium molybdenate. Electron 
micrographs were captured using a Tecnai G2 Spirit BioTwin transmission electron microscope 
(FEI, United States). 
2.8 Protein Modelling  
The amino acid sequence of the spike proteins for CoV1087 and PEDV CH-HYNF-14 (APH81306) 
were modelled using the Phyre2 web portal (130). Molecular graphics and analyses of the 
modelled proteins were performed with UCSF Chimera (131). 
2.9 Protein sequence alignment  
A MUSCLE alignment, using Geneious 11.1.3 was performed on the aminopeptidase N proteins 
from three different species; Sus scrofa (XP_005653580), Homo sapiens (AAA51719.1) and 
Oryctolagus cuniculus (NP_00107579.1). N-Glycosylation sites in the three proteins were 




3. Results  
3.1 System optimisation and confirmation of pseudotyped lentivirus production 
3.1.1 Confirmation of CoV1087-pCDNA3.1(+) plasmid construction   
To ensure that the CoV1087 spike gene had been correctly inserted into the CoV1087-
pCDNA3.1(+) vector, Sanger sequencing was conducted on a 500 bp amplified section of the 
plasmid. This sequencing confirmed that the insertion of the gene was successful, with 100% 
conservation of the sequence results to the reference vector (Appendix II).  
3.1.2 Comparison of GFP levels produced by pHIVEGFP and pPS-CMV-copGFP  
To determine the optimal transfer plasmid for use in the creation of pseudotyped lentiviruses, 
the fluorescence of the transfer plasmids pHIVEGFP and pPS-CMV-copGFP were compared when 
transfections were undertaken in conjunction with pMD2.G and pCMV-dr8.2dvpr. The 
fluorescence produced following transfection was higher in the 293T cells which had been 
transfected with pPS-CMV-copGFP and significantly lower in cells which had been transfected 
with pHIVEGFP (Figure 10).  
In order to prove that viral particle assembly had occurred, infections of the VSV-G pseudotyped 
lentiviruses created with the two different transfer plasmids were conducted in 293T cells. 
Fluorescence was produced following infection with the VSV-G pseudotyped lentivirus 
constructed with the pPS-CMV-copGFP transfer plasmid, confirming that viral assembly and the 
infection process had been successful. No fluorescence was produced following 293T infection 




Figure 10. Comparison of fluorescence produced by the transfer plasmids pHIVEGFP and pPS-
CMV-copGFP. A. Transfection of 293T cells with two different transfer plasmids; pHIVEGFP and 
pPS-CMV-copGFP in conjunction with pMD2.G and the pCMV-dr8.2dvpr to produce VSV-G 
pseudotyped lentivirus. Photographs were taken 24 hours post-transfection. B. Infection of 
293T cells with VSV-G pseudotyped lentivirus created with the two different transfer plasmids, 
pHIVEGFP and pPS-CMV-copGFP. Photographs were taken 48 hours post-infection using a 20x 





3.1.3 Electron Microscopy  
Electron microscopy was performed on harvested viral supernatant to confirm the production 
and assembly of CoV1087 pseudotyped particles visually. Viral particles with a diameter of 
approximately 65 nm were identified in the sample. CoV1087 pseudotyped particles had a 
clearly defined nucleocapsid and viral envelope, with small projections observable extending 
from the viral envelope, which may represent incorporated spike proteins. The nucleocapsid 
itself was circular in shape, occupying approximately two-thirds of the viral envelope. Some 
particles presented with a darker, filled capsid, indicating that this area was more permissible to 
the negative stain, whilst others remained impermeable, clearly showing the outline of the 




Figure 11. Transmission electron micrographs of CoV1087 pseudotyped lentiviral particles. 
Particles indicated are 65 nm in size. A. Viral particle which has been penetrated by the 
negative stain. B. Viral particle which has remained impermeable to negative staining. 
Micrographs captured using a Tecnai G2 Spirit BioTwin transmission electron microscope. Scale 




3.2 Cell tropism of CoV1087  
 
3.2.1 Initial infections with CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus  
Following the confirmation of CoV1087 particle assembly by electron microscopy, the infectivity 
of CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus particles was assessed in a panel of cell lines. To accomplish 
this 293T, CaCo-2, EL, FPK, PK-15 and Vero cells, were inoculated with unconcentrated CoV1087 
pseudotyped lentivirus, with VSV-G pseudotyped lentivirus used as a positive control. All cell 
lines were successfully infected with the VSV-G pseudotyped lentivirus, indicating that the 
method used could facilitate cell infections. Among the cell lines tested only 293Ts 
demonstrated susceptibility to the CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus, with 3 cells expressing 
fluorescence in a single well of a 6-well plate (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Unconcentrated CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus infections in cultured cells. Cell 
lines were infected with 450 µl of unconcentrated CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus. Cells were 
then examined and photographed under a fluorescent microscope at 48 hours post-infection. 
VSV-G pseudotyped lentivirus was used as a positive control. All photographs taken using a 20x 




3.2.2 Pilot study of infection with concentrated CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus  
A pilot test of infection with concentrated CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus was performed to 
confirm the susceptibility of 293T cells to the virus. This involved the inoculation of 293T cells 
with CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus which had been concentrated 20-fold by centrifugation. 
Inoculation of 293T cells with concentrated virus confirmed their susceptibility, with 367 
fluorescent cells present in the single well of a 6-well plate (Figure 13).   
 
 
Figure 13. Pilot infection of 293T cells with concentrated CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus. The 
293T cells were infected with 250 µl of CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus concentrated 20-fold 
by centrifugation. Cells were examined and photographed under a fluorescent microscope, 




3.2.3 Cell tropism of CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus  
In order to more thoroughly investigate the cell tropism of CoV1087, CoV1087 pseudotyped 
lentivirus was concentrated 10-fold by ultrafiltration. This 10-fold concentrate and the flow 
through from ultrafiltration was inoculated into 293T, CaCo-2, FPK, PK-15, RK-13 and Vero cells, 
with VSV-G pseudotyped lentivirus used as a positive control. After fixing and examination at 72 
hours post-infection, the 293T, CaCo-2 and RK-13 cells showed fluorescence, demonstrating 
susceptibility to the CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus (Figure 14). Notably, the fluorescence 
demonstrated by the RK-13 cells was present as discrete granules within the cytoplasm, in 
contrast to other cell types with diffuse fluorescence. However, this matched the fluorescence 
patterning produced by the cells when infected with the positive control VSV-G pseudotyped 
virus. None of the cell lines tested demonstrated fluorescence after inoculation with the flow 




Figure 14. Concentrated CoV1087 pseudotyped lentvirus infections in cultured cells. Various cell lines were infected with 500 µl of CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus 
concentrated 10-fold by ultrafiltration. Infected cell cultures were fixed with 4% paraformaldehyde 72 hours post-infection and examined and photographed 
under a fluorescent microscope. VSV-G pseudotyped lentivirus was used as a positive control.  
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3.2.4 Spike protein modelling  
Modelling of the spike proteins CoV1087 and PEDV strain CH-HNYF-14 was conducted using the 
Phyre2 program to compare structural similarities, with the results visualised and analysed 
through UCSF Chimera (130, 131). The CoV1087 spike protein had 92% of its residues modelled 
at greater than 90% confidence and PEDV CH-HNYF-14 spike protein had 91% of its residues 
modelled at greater than 90% confidence (Figure 12). Statistical analysis on the structural 
similarity between the two spike proteins showed a root mean square deviation (RMSD) value 
of 2.345 using an alignment length of 1,377 amino acids, a Q-score of 0.372 and a structural 
distance measure (SDM) of 48.508. As close structural similarity is suggested by a RMSD value 
of less than 2 and a Q-score of greater than 0.4 it can be concluded that, whilst related the two 





Figure 15. Alphacoronavirus spike protein models constructed using Phyre2 and visualised with UCSF Chimera. A. CoV1087 spike protein. B. PEDV CH-HNYF-14 
spike protein. C. Superimposition of CoV1087 spike protein and PEDV CH-HNYF-14 spike protein.  
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3.2.5 Protein sequence alignments  
To try to determine possible species specific differences in the APN protein which may effect 
CoV1087’s possible use of it as a receptor protein, a sequence alignment was performed on the 
amino acid sequence from three mammalian species; pig (Sus scrofa), human (Homo sapiens) 
and rabbit (Oryctolagus cuniculus) (Appendix III). An overall pairwise percentage identity of 
78.5% was obtained for the three sequences, with 70.9% of the aligned amino acid residues 
consisting of identical sites.  
To further investigate the level of conservation which may effect viral binding to the receptor, 
three viral binding motifs (VBMs) were identified based on those determined in porcine APN by 
Chen et al. (2012) and the sequences compared across the three species (Figure 16) (134).  Of 
the three VBMS, VBM I displayed the lowest amount of conservation with only 26.7% pairwise 
identity and only one identical site out of the 10 residue length. VBM II displayed a higher level 
of conservation with a pairwise identity of 51.1% and 33% identical sites within the sequence. 
VBM III displayed the highest level of conservation with a pairwise identity of 59.7% and 50% 
identical amino acid residues. None of the three VBMs displayed a higher level of conservation 
between the human and rabbit proteins than either the human and pig or rabbit and pig 
orthologs.  
In order to determine what may prevent CoV1087 from entering porcine cells the N-
glycosylation sites present in the three VBMs were determined using the NetNGlyc 1.0 server 
(132). From this a single N-glycosylation site was found at residue 292 in VBM I of the Sus scrofa 





VBM I     
 289         298 
Sus scrofa Q S V N E T A Q N G 
Oryctolagus cuniculus T N I E A Q S P N N 
Homo sapiens D Y V E K Q A S N G 
 
VBM II 
 736              750 
Sus scrofa H F E T L T K N W T E R P E N 
Oryctolagus cuniculus H F K N I T N D W T R R P D T 
Homo sapiens H F R N N T N N W R E I P E N 
 
VBM III 
 768                       791 
Sus scrofa G L P Q C E N L A K T L F D Q W M S D P E N N P 
Oryctolagus cuniculus G I Q E C E T L V S D L F K Q W M D D P S N N P 
Homo sapiens G V P E C E E M V S G L F K Q W M E N P N N N P 
     
Figure 16. Sequence alignment of aminopeptidase N viral binding motifs (VBMs) amino acid 
sequences from three mammalian species; Sus scrofa (XP_005653580), Homo sapiens 
(AAA51719.1) and Oryctolagus cuniculus (NP_00107579.1). VBM boundaries were categorized 
based on the VBMs determined by Chen and colleagues for porcine APN (134). Green shading 
represents full conservation, orange shading conservation between two of the three species, 





4. Discussion  
Since the SARS epidemic in 2003, and the subsequent identification of bats as the reservoir host, 
there has been a surge in research into bat-borne viruses and bat virus interactions. In the 15 
years since the SARS epidemic over 30 bat coronaviruses have been discovered, with the list still 
expanding (135). Investigating the cell tropism of these newly discovered coronaviruses deepens 
the understanding of their pathology and possible host ranges as well as allowing assessments 
to be made on their zoonotic potential. In this study a second generation lentiviral pseudotyping 
system was developed, allowing the spike protein of the non-isolated coronavirus CoV1087 to 
be safely expressed on a lentiviral particle, in order to assess cell tropism. This system was 
developed to allow investigation into the cell tropism of this recently discovered, potentially 
zoonotic agent safely in a PC2 laboratory environment. CoV1087 is a newly discovered 
Alphacoronavirus in the South-West of Western Australia with a 70% similarity at both the 
coding RNA and amino acid level between its spike protein and that of porcine epidemic diarrhea 
virus strain CH-HNYF-14. This similarity between spike proteins indicated a possible risk for 
transmission into more than one mammalian species, and particularly for transmission into pigs. 
Various mammalian cell lines were inoculated with the CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus to 
investigate the cell tropism and, indirectly, the multi-species infectious potential of CoV1087. It 
was originally hypothesised that PK-15 and FPK cells would be susceptible to the CoV1087 
pseudotyped virus due to its close relationship with PEDV CH-HNYF-14, a porcine virus, however 
this was disproved. Rather, this study found that CoV1087 successfully infected two human cell 
lines; 293T cell and CaCo-2 cells, and one rabbit cell line, RK-13. Lentiviral pseudotyping was also 
successfully demonstrated as an appropriate system for the investigation of cellular tropism of 




4.1 Cell Tropism of CoV1087 
The cell tropism of CoV1087 was investigated through the inoculation of various mammalian cell 
lines with a CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus. Initial infections were performed with 
unconcentrated virus, resulting in three positively infected 293T cells (Figure 12). This successful 
infection demonstrated two things; firstly, that the CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus had 
assembled properly, and was capable of infecting susceptible cells, and secondly that 293T cells 
were susceptible to CoV1087 infection. Following this initial test, a pilot study involving the 20-
fold concentration of the CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus and subsequent inoculation of 293T 
cells was performed. This pilot infection resulted in approximately ten times more fluorescent 
cells in the 293T cell line, confirming the initial results and demonstrating that concentration of 
the virus was possible (Figure 13). In order to rule out any possible contamination or batch to 
batch variation in the CoV1087 viral production process as the cause of these positive results, a 
second batch of CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus was produced and subsequently concentrated 
10-fold by ultrafiltration. Inoculations of the 10-fold concentrated CoV1087 pseudotyped 
lentivirus resulted in fluorescence in three different cell lines, 293T, CaCo-2 and RK-13 cells, 
demonstrating their susceptibility to CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus and proving that the 
CoV1087 spike protein permitted entry into these cell types (Figure 14).  
Notably the RK-13 cells presented a very different fluorescence patterning, with discrete small 
fluorescent granules present in the cytoplasm, rather than the more diffuse cytoplasmic 
fluorescence present in the 293T and CaCo-2 cells (Figure 14). It is possible that this is due to 
slower translation of the GFP causing a much smaller amount to present than observed in the 
293T and CaCo-2 cells. It is also possible that the discrete granular patterning was due to changes 
in the G FP localization or leaching of the GFP molecule itself during the fixation process as the 
same fixation protocol can have different effects depending on the cell type (136). It should be 
noted that the fluorescent patterning of the VSV-G positive control in the RK-13 cells matched 
the fluorescence caused by CoV1087, confirming it as a true positive result (Figure 14). 
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The discrepancy between results in the CaCo-2 cell line is likely due to equipment inadequacies. 
During the original unconcentrated infections no fluorescent cells were detected in the CaCo-2 
cell line (Figure 12), however in the subsequent concentrated infections fluorescence was 
observed in the CaCo-2 cell line (Figure 14). The original negative CaCo-2 result obtained during 
the unconcentrated infections may have been a false-negative due to the lower quality and poor 
light source of the Nikon Diaphot fluorescent microscope used in for observation of those 
experiments. In the later round of experiments a much higher-powered Nikon Eclipse TS100 
fluorescent microscope was used, with comparative viewing between the two confirming that 
more positive results were observable under the Nikon Eclipse TS100. Thus, it is possible the 
CaCo-2 cells were expressing fluorescence at a level that was undetectable due to the low power 
of the microscope.  
4.1.1 Non-Susceptibility to porcine cells 
Surprisingly our hypothesis that CoV1087 would infect FPK and PK-15 cells due to its close 
relationship with PEDV strain CH-HNYF-14 was disproven, with no fluorescence produced in the 
FPK or PK-15 cells after inoculation with both concentrated and unconcentrated CoV1087 
pseudotyped lentivirus. There are several possibilities as to why this may have occurred. Firstly, 
protein modelling of the CoV1087 spike protein and that of PEDV CH-HNYF-14 demonstrated 
that structurally the two proteins are statistically dissimilar (Figure 15). These structural 
differences may have caused CoV1087 to recognise different receptors than PEDV, changing its 
cellular tropism. Previous studies into SARS-CoV and the SARS like CoVs isolated from palm civets 
and bats found that the change of just two amino acid residues within the spike protein allowed 
SARS-CoV to recognise the human ACE2 and make the cross-species jump, thus very small 
changes can have a large impact on receptor recognition in coronaviruses (98). Because 
CoV1087 and PEDV CH-HNYF-14 only had 70% similarity in their spike proteins, the initial 
assumption that they would have the same cellular tropism appears to be incorrect as the 30% 
difference in residues would have a large effect on the spike protein structure.  
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It is also possible, though less likely that CoV1087 cannot enter porcine kidneys, but may be 
permissible to other porcine tissue types. As the only two porcine cell lines tested were both 
kidney cell lines other tissue types cannot be ruled out. The testing of other porcine enteric cell 
lines in further studies may provide clarification.   
4.1.2 Possible viral receptors  
Coronaviruses, especially Alphacoronaviruses, have a very small range of receptors which they 
use to obtain cell entry. APN is one of the most common host receptors used by this viral family, 
recognised by TGEV and human coronavirus 229-E (HCoV-229E) (137, 138). PEDV, the virus most 
closely related to CoV1087 was also thought to utilise APN as a viral receptor however this has 
recently been disproved (108). Human APN (hAPN) is preferentially expressed in the human 
colon and kidney, the two tissue types represented in 293T and CaCo-2 cell lines (139). 
Unfortunately, no expression data exists for rabbit APN (rAPN) in rabbit tissues to confirm its 
presentation in the RK-13 cell line.  
It is possible that CoV1087 recognises hAPN and rAPN but not porcine APN (pAPN) due to subtle 
changes in the protein structure, especially the viral binding motifs (VBMs). Protein sequence 
alignments of APN orthologs from these three species showed an overall high level of 
conservation between the APN proteins (Appendix II). Further analysis of the VBMs, the areas 
of the protein responsible for direct interaction with coronaviruses, demonstrated a low level of 
conservation in VBM I and a high level of conservation in VBM III between the three species 
(Figure 16). VBM I is recognised by the Alphacoronavirus HCoV-229E, which is known to bind to 
hAPN but not the porcine ortholog, due to the glycosylation of pAPN at amino acid residue 289 
preventing it from entering porcine cells (140). rAPN does not possess this glycosylation at VBM 
I, suggesting that HCoV229-E could possibly enter RK-13 cells, though no studies have been 
conducted to investigate this possibility. Thus, the possibility remains that CoV1087 could utilise 
VBM I, within the rAPN and hAPN receptors for cell entry.   
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Ultimately, further study must be undertaken in order to determine whether APN is the viral 
receptor for CoV1087. This could be conducted using CoV1087 pseudotyped lentiviruses as 
probes, allowing the investigation of the viral receptor without the need for an isolated virus. 
The knock down of APN in the three susceptible cell lines; 293T, CaCo-2 and RK-13 using the 
CRISPR/Cas9 system and subsequent inoculation of CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus could 
provide further evidence towards the use of APN as CoV1087’s viral receptor. Similar studies 
have been performed to confirm that APN is not the viral receptor for PEDV (141). Furthermore, 
gain of function studies could be conducted through the transfection of hAPN and rAPN into non 
susceptible cell lines such as PK-15 and Vero, forcing APN expression, such as those conducted 
for the investigation into PEDV’s use of APN (91). If these cell lines then become susceptible to 
CoV1087 following inoculation this is further evidence to support the use of APN as a viral 
receptor for CoV1087.  
4.1.3 Implications of CoV1087’s cellular tropism  
The cellular tropism indicated by the CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus suggests that CoV1087 
has the potential for transmission into other host species. The susceptibility of RK-13 cells to 
CoV1087 raises the possibility of its spread into feral rabbits present in the microbat’s natural 
habitat. Furthermore, the susceptibility of 293T and CaCo-2 cells to CoV1087 also suggests that 
the virus could make the host switch from bats to humans. It should be noted that pseudotyped 
lentiviral cell entry is only indicative of the ability of the virus to enter susceptible cell lines and, 
not of successful viral replication in that cell line. Considering coronaviruses propensity for host-
switching the possibility of zoonotic transfer cannot be ruled out without further investigation. 
What these results serve to demonstrate is that CoV1087 does have pathogenic potential and is 
worth investigating further. 
4.2 Lentiviral pseudotyping system  
The cell tropism results discussed above serve to demonstrate that the lentiviral pseudotyping 
system developed in this study is a valid technique for the investigation of the cell tropism of 
54 
 
coronaviruses. Through the process of system development, the importance of the correct 
transfer plasmid was highlighted, as well as several advantages and limitations of the system.   
4.2.1 Transfer plasmids 
The importance of the transfer plasmid used for the development of pseudotyped lentivirus 
particles was highlighted when pHIVEGFP produced very little fluorescence in transfections and 
no fluorescence in infections, whereas pPS-CMV-copGFP produced very bright fluorescence in 
both (Figure 10). This discrepancy was likely due to differences in the plasmid’s genomic 
organisation. pHIVEGFP has an internal ribosome entry site (IRES) sequence in front of the GFP 
coding sequence to allow the expression of both a fluorescent reporter gene and a transgene 
simultaneously (Figure 5) (142). However, since this study did not require a transgene to be 
inserted into pHIVEGFP there was no second gene to be expressed causing a nonsense protein 
to be translated simultaneously with GFP, resulting in the significant reduction of fluorescence 
observed. The pPS-CMV-copGFP plasmid lacks an IRES sequence, instead possessing a promoter 
followed by the GFP gene, allowing for increased translation of the GFP protein (Figure 6). This 
has demonstrated that, for a cell tropism study using pseudotyped lentiviruses, the design of 
the transfer plasmid should be carefully considered and optimised before infections begin.  
4.2.2 Advantages of the system  
Enhanced safety of pseudotyped lentivirus is a significant advantage, as the viral particles 
produced are non-replicative. In the unlikely event of human infection occurring the virus will 
not be able to replicate and spread (113). This allows research into the cell tropism of viruses 
with unknown pathogenic potential, such as CoV1087, to be conducted within the confines of a 
PC2 laboratory, reducing the overall cost of the research and removing the barrier that a lack of 
adequate facilities may create (111). Lentiviral pseudotyping has been utilised for this very 
purpose during the SARS and MERS epidemics, allowing more laboratories to work 
simultaneously on an understanding of their cell entry (118, 143). 
Often viruses can be difficult to culture or, like CoV1087, have not yet been successfully isolated 
from the host. Lentiviral pseudotyping allows the initial, rapid characterization of cellular 
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tropism without the need for isolation and the establishment of viral cultures, enabling lentiviral 
pseudotyping to be used as a screening tool for the identification of viruses with pathogenic 
potential that warrant further investigation.  
Whilst the advantages of this system are apparent, the accuracy of the cell tropism results 
obtained through its use should also be discussed. Various studies have been conducted which 
have compared the cell tropism of pseudotyped coronaviruses to their live parent viruses, all of 
which have come to the conclusion that the cell tropism is the same between live viruses and 
their lentiviral pseudotypes (115, 144, 145). This is because the spike protein of coronaviruses is 
the main determinant of cell entry, allowing spike protein pseudotyped lentiviruses to 
accurately replicate the process of cell entry (93). Thus, the pseudotyping system acts as an 
excellent tool for analysis into the cell entry of novel coronaviruses.  
4.2.3 Limitations of the system  
Whilst this system has been shown to be a successful method for determining the cell tropism 
of non-isolated, novel coronaviruses it is not without its limitations. During the beginning of this 
study there was great difficulty in confirming that viral assembly had occurred and CoV1087 
pseudotyped lentivirus cell entry was possible. This is because due to the limitations of this study 
the only method available for determining whether viral assembly had successfully occurred was 
through the use of a cell-based assay. Various alternatives to cell-based assays exist but they are 
not without their own flaws. 
ELISA on the HIV-1 p24 protein and qPCR to directly measure lentiviral RNA are two commonly 
used alternatives to cell-based assays. However both of these methods are non-discriminatory 
between defective and mature particles, leading to an overestimation of the amount of 
infectious virus in the sample (146, 147) Electron microscopy can also be used, as was done in 
this study, to confirm that viral particles are being produced (Figure 11), however it relies on 
having access to specialised equipment, and the inherent poor sensitivity of electron microscopy 
for viral detection can be problematic. Through careful analysis of particle morphology, 
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defective particles can be distinguished from mature particles and an accurate titre determined, 
however for every functional particle, there are approximately 100 defective particles produced, 
leading to more particle counting than is reasonable  (148, 149).  
This leaves cell-based assays as the best discriminatory method for titering lentiviral 
pseudotypes, as it only measures infectious particles capable of cell entry. However, in the case 
of novel bat coronaviruses, it is possible that the virus will not recognise receptors on any of the 
cell lines tested due to species specific adaptation, a problem that can be resolved with immortal 
bat cell lines. Unfortunately, bat cell lines remain at a high cost and thus weren’t financially 
feasible for use in this study. 
Another limitation for the use of pseudotyped lentiviruses is the lack of availability of a sufficient 
negative control. Whilst some studies use a “mock” negative control, which involves not adding 
any pseudotyped lentivirus, this does not truly encapsulate what a negative control is, as there 
is no possible way for fluorescence to be produced (115, 150). An ideal negative control for the 
experiments conducted during this project would contain a pseudotyped lentivirus constructed 
via the use of an envelope plasmid which does not contain a spike protein gene. This would allow 
us to confident that the spike protein mediated viral cell entry, and no other outside forces. 
Whilst this would be an ideal negative control, the successful creation of such a pseudotyped 
lentivirus is unlikely as the spike protein is important for the mediation of viral particle stability; 
thus, formation of viral particles would be unlikely to occur, and any particle which did form 
would be very unstable, making it no longer effective as a negative control (93). Due to these 
issues a negative control was not used in this study, as per other studies conducted in this field 
(116, 117, 145).  
4.2.4 Improvements to be made 
There are several improvements that could be made to the lentiviral system developed in this 
study. The low number of fluorescent cells obtained in susceptible cell lines indicates that the 
CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus was being produced at a low titre. To quantify the amount of 
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CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus being produced viral titering should be performed after the 
next round of CoV1087 pseudotyped lentivirus production, using a cell-based assay such as 
median tissue culture infectious dose (TCID50). In order to do this accurately, a highly permissive 
cell line is optimal, and obtaining a bat cell line, preferably of microbat as opposed to flying-fox 
origin would be a key step. 
In order to increase the amount of CoV1087 viral particles produced various steps could be 
taken.  Codon optimisation of the envelope protein genes for expression in human cells has been 
shown to dramatically increase the amount of pseudotyped viral particles obtained, thus codon 
optimisation of the CoV1087 spike protein may improve viral titre (151). If following codon 
optimisation, the viral titre was still low, modifications to the spike protein gene itself may be 
utilised for improvement. One recent study found that partial truncation of the SARS-CoV spike 
protein’s cytoplasmic tail dramatically improved viral titre without affecting the cellular tropism 
results obtained, an option which could be considered for the modification of CoV1087’s spike 




This study has resulted in the development of a lentiviral pseudotyping system that allows the 
efficient analysis of the cellular tropism of coronaviruses. The investigation into the cellular 
tropism of CoV1087 found that the virus could successfully enter two human cell lines; 293T and 
CaCo-2 as well as the rabbit cell line RK-13. This raises the possibility of viral transfer to feral 
rabbits as well as the possibility of human infection.  
Further directions for the investigation of CoV1087 include attempting to isolate the virus from 
its natural host, Chalinlobus gouldii. This would involve further trapping of microbats in the 
South West to gain enough samples for successful viral isolation. Other research into CoV1087 
would include the investigation of possible viral receptors, such as APN, through knock out and 
gain of function experiments.  
With the lentiviral pseudotyping system in place further work could be undertaken into the 
investigation of other novel coronaviruses which have been discovered in Western Australian 
microbats. This would allow the system to be used as a screening tool to identify novel 
coronaviruses of pathogenic concern. Furthermore, the system could be adapted further for the 
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Figure 17. A. Full genome of CoV1087 with key genes annotated. B. Gene construct of the CoV1087 spike protein gene created with a Kozac sequence at the 5’ 










1    gatatccacc atgaacgtac tgtactttgt cacactattt gtcgccgttt gtggctctga 
61   tgttgttacc atttgtaaca aaccgttcaa ctttcagcgg tttttttcaa agtttaatgt 
121  tcaatcgcct gctgttgtag ttgttggtgg ttatttacca caacttaatg gttcttggga 
181  ttgctctaaa aacacccttg ttactgattc agatgtttat ggagtgtttt tccgttatgt 
241  agactctggt aggggtgttg agttgggtgt ttcccaaagt cagttttctg aaaactccta 
301  ccagctatat tttcataagc ctactaatgg caatcctggc gcaactgctt ggctgcgcat 
361  ttgcaagtat tcgaataaaa ctttgggtcc aacttatggg tctatgggtg agatttcaac 
421  tggtaaagct tgtcttatta atcaaagagt gccagcattt ttccaagata acgttggtat 
481  cgtcataggt ttaacatggg attccaatgg tttgactgtg ttcgccgaca aaatttaccg 
541  ttttaacttg cctaacgcct ggtctagagc tgttgctcgg tgttacgacc ccaacagctg 
601  tgcttttcaa tttgtcaaaa cacccagtta ttatgtgctt aatgtcacag gtcctaatgt 
661  ctccgatata cagtatgaaa tgtgtgctgg tgattgcaca ggttacgcca ataatgtctt 
721  tgccacaagc tctgtaggcc atataccaga tggttttagt tttaataact ggtttttgct 
781  ttctaatgat tcaactttgg ttcaaggcaa ggttgtgtcg ttacaaccac tcaaggttaa 
841  ttgtttgtgg ccagtaccac gtatacaagg tgtgcaacag tattttgatt ttaaccagac 
901  tgtagatggc gtgtgtaatg gtgctactat tcaagagccg cctgaagctt tgaggtttaa 
961  tgttaatgat acctctgttt tgctttctga aggcgctata gttttacatt cagttagtgg 
1021 cgctaatttg tcctttgaat gtggcaactc aacaaccccg ccaagtactt tgtatacatc 
1081 acttttaggt gaacgagttg tgactttgca acctttttat tgcttcctca aaacccaatt 
1141 ttctaatggc acttcttata attttcttgc cattttgcct aatgtagtta gggaaattgt 
1201 tattaccaaa tatggtagtg tctatgtgaa tggttttggt taccttcaca ttggaccctt 
1261 atctgctgtc accattgatt ttagttctca cagcacgtca accgatgtct ctgggttttg 
1321 gacaattgct tccacaaatt ttgctgaaac actgatacag gtcaatggta ctaacattca 
1381 gcgtgttttg tattgtgatg atcctgttag tcaattgaag tgttctcagc tttcttttga 
1441 cttgcaagat ggcttctatc ctatggcatc taccacactt gcccaagagc aaccactgtc 
1501 attcgtgacg ctaccatcgt ttaataacca tgcttattta aatattagtg tctcgggttt 
1561 ctttgagaag aatggtggtc agttgacgaa tgttagtgct tcaattaata atgcagagca 
1621 attttgtgtt aatacgcgcc agttcacact caaaacagac ctctatattg ggcctgggcc 
1681 tccttttacg tatgcgcgtc ttgagagtaa atgtccattt acactcgact cacttaataa 
1741 ttatttgtct tttagcaagt tttgtgttag ttttacctca ctcgcggcct cttgtactat 
1801 agatgtgtat ggtcattatg cctatggtct tgctaatggt cagacgtttc gttatgagag 
1861 tttggtcact actatgtact ttcagcatgc acctggggag ttgctcactg gaactcctaa 
1921 gccattgcat ggcttagaag atgtctcctt tttgaaccta gatgtgtgta cgaagtacac 
1981 tatttatggt tttaaaggtg agggcatcat ccgtgaaacc aacaccagtt acctctctgg 
2041 catatattat acctctgagg ctggtcagtt gttggctttt aagaatgtga ctagtggtgt 
2101 tgtttactca gttactccat gctctttttc tcaacaggct gcatttatag atggggatat 
2161 tgttggtgtc atttcgagtc tttctaattc tacctttaat gctaccagag aattacctgg 
2221 tttttattat cactctaatg atgctgacaa ttgcacagac cctgtcctcg tttatagtaa 
2281 cattggtgtt tgccgtagtg gcagtattgg ttacgtgcca ccacgtgaaa accagcctaa 
2341 attggcgcct atggtcactg gtaatattag cattcccacc aattttacaa tgagcataag 
2401 gactgagtat ttgcaattat ataacgctcc tgtgagtgtt gattgcgcta tgtacgtctg 
2461 taatggcaat gaacgttgca aacaattact tacacaatac acttctgctt gcaacgctat 
2521 acagacttcg ttacaactca gtgctagatt ggaatcgttt gaagttaatt ccatgctcac 
2581 ggtttctgac gaagcactta atcttgcaac tattgataaa ttcaatggtg gagattataa 
2641 ttttactagt gtcctgggtg ccacttataa tagccgctct gccattgaag atcttctctt 
2701 cgacaaagtg gttactaatg gtttaggcac cgttgatgaa gattataagc gttgttctaa 
2761 cggtttgtcc attgctgacc tggcgtgtgc tcagtattat tctggtgtta tggtgcttcc 
2821 tggtgttgtc gatgctgaga aattgcacat gtatagcgct tctcttgtgg gtggtatggc 
2881 tcttggcggt atcacttcgg cagctgctct tccttttagt tatgctgttc aagcacgtct 
2941 taactatctt gcacttcaaa ccgatgtttt gcaacgtaac caacagattt tggctgaatc 
3001 ttttaactcc gctataggta atattacctt ggcttttgag agtgttaatg aggccattag 
3061 tcagacatcg cagggtttgc agactgttgc tcaggccctt gaaaaagttc aaggcgttgt 
3121 taattcacag ggtgctgctt tgtcgcatct gactttacag ttgcaacaca atttccaagc 
3181 catttctagc tctatagatg atatttatgc taggcttgac caattgactg ctgatgccca 
3241 ggtggacagg attattacag gacggcttgc agctcttaat gcttttgttt cacagactct 
3301 tactaagtat actgaagttc aggctagtag gaggcttgca caacaaaaag tcaatgagtg 
3361 tgttaaatca cagtctcaac gttacggatt ttgtggcgac gatggtgagc acattttctc 
3421 tatcgttcaa gccgcacctc aaggactgtt attcttgcac accgtcttag tacctggtgc 
3481 ttttgtcaat gtggttgcta ttgcggggct ttgtgtggat gacacaatgg ccatgaccct 
3541 tagagaagct ggacttgttt tgtttacata tgagggtggt gacgattatt atgttacttc 
3601 acgcaaaatg tttgaaccac gcagccccac tgtttctgat ttcgttcaaa tcgagagttg 
3661 tttggttact tatgttaatc tcacaagtga tttgctaccc gacgttatac ctgattatat 
3721 tgacgttaat aagacattgg aggagattct agctggtttg cctaacagaa ctcagccatc 
70 
 
3781 tttgcctctt gatgtcttta atgcaacata tcttaattta actggcgaga tagcagacct 
3841 agagatgagg tcagaagctc tcagaaacac gaccgacgag ttgcgccatt taattaatag 
3901 tattaataat accatggtta acttagagtg gcttaataga gttgaaactt atattaagtg 
3961 gccttggtgg gtctggttaa ttattgttgt ttcacttgtt cttgttggtt cgttgcttgt 
4021 gttttgctgt atttctactg gctgttgtgg ttgttgcgga tgttgtggtg catgttttag 
4081 tagctgttgt aggggttcta ggcttcaacc ttacgaacat attgaaaaaa tccacgtgca 
4141 ataagcggcc gc 
 
Figure 18. Full nucleotide sequence of the CoV1087 spike protein gene construct created with 
a Kozac sequence at the 5’ termini (pink) and restrictions sites EcoRV at the 5’ termini (green) 












Sus scrofa   MAKGFYISKALGILGILLGVAAVATIIALSVVYAQEKNKNAEHVP-QAPTSPTITTT----AAITLDQSKPWNRYRLPTTL LPDSYNVTLRPYLTPNADGLYIFKGKSIVRF 
Oryctolagus cuniculus MAKGFYISKSLGILGILLGVAALCTIVALSVVYRQEKNKNTSQSPSMAPLNPTATSS----PATTLDQNLPWNRYRLPKTL IPDSYNVVLRPYLSPNSQGLYIFTGSSTVRF 
Homo sapiens   MAKGFYISKSLGILGILLGVAAVCTIIALSVVYSQEKNKNANSSP-VASTTPSASATTNPASATTLDQSKAWNRYRLPNTL KPDSYQVTLRPYLTPNDRGLYVFKGSSTVRF 
 
Sus scrofa   ICQEPTDVIIIHSKKLNYT-TQGHMVVLRGVGDSQVPEIDRTELVELTEYLVVHLKGSLQPGHMYEMESEFQGELADDLAGFYRSEYMEGNVKKVLATTQMQSTDARKSFPCF 
Oryctolagus cuniculus TCQEATNVIIIHSKKLNYTITQGHRVVLRGVRGSQPPAIASTELVELTEYLVVHLQGQLVAGSQYEMDTQFQGELADDLAGFYRSEYMEGNVRKVVATTQMQAADARKSFPCF 
Homo sapiens   TCKEATDVIIIHSKKLNYTLSQGHRVVLRGVGGSQPPDIDKTELVEPTEYLVVHLKGSLVKDSQYEMDSEFEGELADDLAGFYRSEYMEGNVRKVVATTQMQAADARKSFPCF 
 
Sus scrofa  DEPAMKATFNITLIHPNNLTALSNMPPKGSSTPLAEDPNWSVTEFETTPVMSTYLLAYIVSEFQSVNETAQNGVLIRIWARPNAIAEGHGMYALNVTGPILNFFANHYNTPYP 
Oryctolagus cuniculus DEPAMKATFNITPIHPRDYTALSNMLPR-SSTALPEDPNWTVTEFHTTPKMSTYLLAYIVSEFTNIEAQSPNNVQIRIWARPSAISEGHGQYALNVTGPILNFFANHYNTPYP 
Homo sapiens  DEPAMKAEFNITLIHPKDLTALSNMLPKGPSTPLPEDPNWNVTEFHTTPKMSTYLLAFIVSEFDYVEKQASNGVLIRIWARPSAIAAGHGDYALNVTGPILNFFAGHYDTPYP 
 
Sus Scrofa  LPKSDQIALPDFNAGAMENWGLVTYRENALLFDPQSSSISNKERVVTVIAHELAHQWFGNLVTLAWWNDLWLNEGFASYVEYLGADHAEPTWNLKDLIVPGDVYRVMAVDALA 
Oryctolagus cuniculus LEKSDQIGLPDFNAGAMENWGLVTYRESALLFDPLVSSISNKERVVTVVAHELAHQWFGNLVTVDWWNDLWLNEGFASYVEYLGADYAEPTWNLKDLIVLNELHSVMAVDALA 
Homo sapiens  LPKSDQIGLPDFNAGAMENWGLVTYRENSLLFDPLSSSSSNKERVVTVIAHELAHQWFGNLVTIEWWNDLWLNEGFASYVEYLGADYAEPTWNLKDLMVLNDVYRVMAVDALA 
 
Sus scrofa  SSHPLTTPAEEVNTPAQISEMFDSISYSKGASVIRMLSNFLTEDLFKEGLASYLHAFAYQNTTYLDLWEHLQKAVDAQTSIRLPDTVRAIMDRWTLQMGFPVITVDTKTGNIS 
Oryctolagus cuniculus SSHPLSSPADEVNTPAQISELFDSITYSKGASVLRMLSSFLTEDLFKEGLASYLHTFAYQNTIYLDLWEHLQQAVNSQSAIQLPASVRDIMDRWILQMGFPVVTVNTTNGIIS 
Homo sapiens  SSHPLSTPASEINTPAQISELFDAISYSKGASVLRMLSSFLSEDVFKQGLASYLHTFAYQNTIYLNLWDHLQEAVNNRS-IQLPTTVRDIMNRWTLQMGFPVITVDTSTGTLS 
 
Sus scrofa   QKHFLLDSESNVTRSSAFDYLWIVPISSIKNGVMQDHYWLRDVSQAQNDLFKTASD-DWVLLNINVTGYFQVNYDEDNWRMIQHQLQTNLSVIPVINRAQVIYDSFNLATAHM 
Oryctolagus cuniculus SHHFLLDPTSNVTRPSDFNYLWIVPVSSMRNGVLEQEFWLEGVEQTQNSLFRVEGDNNWILANLNVTGYYQVNYDEGNWKKLQTQLQTNPSVIPVINRAQIIHDAFNLASAQK 





Sus scrofa   VPVTLALDNTLFLNGEKEYMPWQAALSSLSYFSLMFDRSEVYGPMKKYLRKQVEPLFQHFETLTKNWTERPENLMDQYSEINAISTACSNGLPQCENLAKTLFDQWMSDPENNP 
Oryctolagus cuniculus VPVTLALDNTLFLIRETEYMPWQAALSSLNYFKLMFDRSEVYGPMKNYLSKQVRPLFEHFKNITNDWTRRPDTLMDQYNEINAISTACSNGIQECETLVSDLFKQWMDDPSNNP 
Homo sapiens   VPVTLALNNTLFLIEERQYMPWEAALSSLSYFKLMFDRSEVYGPMKNYLKKQVTPLFIHFRNNTNNWREIPENLMDQYSEVNAISTACSNGVPECEEMVSGLFKQWMENPNNNP 
 
Sus scrofa  IHPNLRSTIYCNAIAQGGQDQWDFAWGQLQQAQLVNEADKLRSALACSNEVWLLNRYLGYTLNPDLIRKQDATSTINSIASNVIGQPLAWDFVQSNWKKLFQDYGGGSFSFSN 
Oryctolagus cuniculus IHPNLRTTVYCNAIALGGEREWDFAWEQFRNATLVNEADKLRSALACSNEVWILNRYLSYTLNPDYIRRQDATSTINSIASNVIGQTLVWDFVQSNWKKLFEDFGGGSFSFAN 
Homo sapiens  IHPNLRSTVYCNAIAQGGEEEWDFAWEQFRNATLVNEADKLRAALACSKELWILNRYLSYTLNPDLIRKQDATSTIISITNNVIGQGLVWDFVQSNWKKLFNDYGGGSFSFSN 
 
Sus scrofa   LIQGVTRRFSSEFELQQLEQFKKNNMDVGFGSGTRALEQALEKTKANIKWVKENKEVVLNWFIEHS- 
Oryctolagus cuniculus LIRAVTRRFSTEYELQQLEQFRLNNLDTGFGSGTRALEQALEQTRANIKWVQENKEAVLAWFTANSA 
Homo sapiens  LIQAVTRRFSTEYELQQLEQFKKDNEETGFGSGTRALEQALEKTKANIKWVKENKEVVLQWFTENSK 
 
Figure 20. Sequence alignment of aminopeptidase N amino acid sequences from three mammalian species; Sus scrofa (XP_005653580), Homo sapiens 
(AAA51719.1) and Oryctolagus cuniculus (NP_00107579.1). Viral binding motif boundaries (VBM I, orange; VBM II, blue; VBM III, green) were categorized based on 
those determined by Chen and colleagues for pAPN (134). 
